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A Trillion-Dollar Question: What Predicts Student Loan Delinquencies? 






The recent significant increase in student loan delinquencies has generated interest in 
understanding the key factors predicting the non-performance of these loans. However, despite the 
large size of the student loan market, existing analyses have been limited by lack of data. This 
paper studies predictors of student loan delinquencies using a nationally representative panel data 
set that anonymously combines individual credit bureau records with Federal Pell Grant and 
federal student loan recipient information, records on college enrollment, graduation and major, 
and school characteristics. We show that borrower-level credit characteristics are important 
predictors of student loan delinquencies. In particular, credit scores of young borrowers are highly 
predictive of future student loan delinquencies, even when measured well before borrowers enter 
repayment. In marked contrast, our results point to only a limited power of student debt levels in 
predicting future student loan credit events. Our findings have potentially useful practical 
implications. For example, access to credit file information when borrowers exit school could help 
to more effectively target student loan borrowers who might benefit from enrolling in income-









ver the past ten years, the real amount of student debt owed by American households more than 
doubled, from about $450 billion to more than $1.1 trillion, with average real debt per borrower 
increasing from about $19,000 to $27,000. As a result of this increase, student loan debt surpassed 
credit card debt as the largest class of non-housing consumer debt in 2010. A potential consequence of the 
higher reliance on student debt to finance higher education, coupled with the adverse effects of the Great 
Recession, is difficulty in meeting these debt obligations. As a possible reflection, the share of balances 90 or 
more days delinquent increased from 6.7% to 11.7%.1 
 
Given the unprecedented rise in student loan debt and delinquencies, the trillion-dollar question is: 
“What predicts student loan delinquencies?” Popular commentary has frequently linked greater odds of 
repayment difficulties to high student loan debt burdens, but given the scarcity of comprehensive data, such 
statements have been mostly based on press anecdotes.2 Using a new, unique data set, this paper studies 
which individual educational, credit, and school characteristics predict student loan delinquencies. Our 
nationally representative panel data anonymously combine individual credit bureau records with Federal Pell 
Grant and federal student loan recipient information, records on college enrollment, graduation and major, 
and school characteristics. The data are based on a sample of individuals aged 23 to 31 years in 2004 and 
span the period 1997-2010.  
 
 
Alvaro Mezza is a senior economist in the Consumer Finance section at the Federal Reserve Board. Kamila Sommer is a senior economist 
in the Real Estate Finance section at the Federal Reserve Board.  
O 
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Using a probability model framework designed to estimate the likelihood with which a student loan 
borrower becomes 120 or more days delinquent on a student loan within five years of entering repayment, 
we show that borrower-level credit characteristics are important predictors of future student loan 
delinquencies. In particular, despite the notion that credit histories of young student loan borrowers are not 
necessarily well established and, consequently, are less likely to be predictive of future credit behavior, we 
show that credit scores of young borrowers are highly predictive of future student loan delinquencies, even 
when measured prior to the borrower entering repayment. In marked contrast, and perhaps contrary to the 
popular narrative, student loan balances are generally not a significant predictor of student loan 
delinquency/default risk, both in statistical and economic terms—a result also shown in Hillman (2014) 
using the 2004/09 Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) survey data from 2003 through 2009.  
 
Our analysis offers additional interesting insights. In particular, other credit indicators remain highly 
predictive of future student loan delinquencies, even after controlling for borrower credit scores. For 
example, and perhaps counter to simple intuition, borrowers with credit card or mortgage debt prior to 
entering repayment are less likely to become delinquent on their student loans than borrowers with no such 
debts, potentially because borrowers with less risky underlying credit profiles are more likely to qualify for 
such debt while in school. Moreover, in our regression specifications that exclude credit variables, degree 
completion and attendance at a for-profit institution (see Hillman, 2014 or Looney and Yannelis, 2015 for 
supporting evidence) are some of the strongest predictors of future student loan delinquencies, both in 
statistical and economic terms.3 However, once credit controls are included in the regression specification, 
their statistical and economic significance declines (though the dropout indicator remains highly statistically 
significant), suggesting that credit variables—and credit scores in particular—are correlated with degree 
completion and attendance of for-profit institutions. These findings, coupled with the low predictive power 
of student loan debt, corroborate the notion that the observed rise in student loan delinquencies in general 
may not be driven by high levels of student loan debt, but rather by other factors that correlate with a 
borrower’s ability to repay it (see, for example, Dynarski and Kreisman, 2013; Hillman, 2014; and Hylands, 
2014). 4  Finally, similar to other studies (see Gross et al., 2009 for a comprehensive review of the existing 
literature, and Looney and Yannelis, 2015 for a recent analysis of defaults on federal student loans), we 
confirm that other factors such as Pell Grant controls—which partly proxy for a borrower’s socioeconomic 
background—are important predictors of student loan delinquencies.  
 
Our findings that credit characteristics are salient predictors of future student loan delinquencies, even 
when measured before borrowers enter repayment, have important practical implications. Coinciding with 
the rapid increase in student debt and delinquencies, a number of initiatives have been put forth to help 
borrowers manage their debt.5 For example, new plans tied to borrowers’ incomes (so-called “income-
driven” repayment plans) were introduced to help borrowers lower their monthly payments to manageable 
levels relative to their income.6,7 While income-driven repayment plans are a potentially promising way to 
alleviate student loan burdens for borrowers who might otherwise be at risk of delinquency, a limited 
number of early indicators of student loan non-performance—such as high student loan balances—have 
been available to policymakers to efficiently target the at-risk population.8 While our results point to a 
limited explanatory power of the level of student loan debt in predicting future student loan delinquency 
risk, our results also suggest that borrowers’ credit scores could be used to identify at-risk borrowers. In 
particular, even the most rudimentary regression specification that includes credit scores and student loan 
balances is able to capture 60% of all student loan delinquencies among the 25% of borrowers most likely to 
become delinquent. Furthermore, the riskiest 15% and 30% of borrowers (as predicted by the model) 
account for 40% and 70% of all student loan delinquencies, respectively.  
 
The purpose of this study is not to devise a method that could be used to underwrite student loans at the 
time a borrower applies for college. Rather, we aim to identify variables that policymakers could use to 
effectively target at-risk borrowers for enrollment in programs designed to mitigate delinquency risk and 
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potentially increase student loan debt manageability at the time when these borrowers exit school or enter 
repayment. To this end, we use a probability model to estimate the likelihood with which a student loan 
borrower becomes delinquent on their student loans using a set of predictive variables that are observed at 
or shortly before exiting school or entering repayment.9 
 
We organized this paper as follows. First, we describe the newly constructed, core data set from which 
we drew the estimation sample used in the analysis, as well as the criteria used for construction of the 
estimation sample. Then we briefly describe the empirical design, interpret the regression output, and use a 
cumulative delinquency curve framework to assess the predictive power of various model specifications. 





We pooled our data from several sources.10 Appendix A discusses the details of the data, checks the 
representativeness of the merged data set against alternative data sources, and provides caveats relevant for 
the analysis.  
 
To summarize, the data set started with a nationally representative random sample of credit bureau 
records, picked and provided by TransUnion LLC, for a cohort of 34,891 individuals who were between 
ages 23 and 31 in 2004.  Individuals were followed over time, with credit records pulled approximately every 
two years, namely, in June 1997, June 2003, December 2004, June 2007, December 2008, and December 
2010. The data contain all major credit bureau variables, including credit scores, tradeline debt levels, and 
delinquency and severe derogatory records. In the next step, we merged on the TransUnion data individual 
educational records through early 2008 from the DegreeVerify (for degrees) and Student Tracker (for 
enrollments) programs by the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). We then used the NSC educational 
institution identifiers to further merge school-level information from the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS), as well as the historical school-level two-year cohort default rates (CDR) 
from the U.S. Department of Education Federal Student Aid (FSA).11,12 Finally, we merged individual-level 
information about Pell Grants and Federal loans—sourced from the National Student Loan Data System 
(NSLDS)—with the data for Pell Grant and federal student loan recipients. Among the 34,891 individuals in 
our total sample, 54% (or 18,748 individuals) have existing NSC postsecondary education enrollment 
records, indicating that these individuals have at least some college education.13  
 
Our analysis targets the subpopulation of our total sample with 1) at least some college education and 2) with 
student loan debt. A total of 11,766 individuals match these two criteria in our sample. This number indicates 
that approximately 60% of college-goers in our sample use student loans to fund their postsecondary 
education.14  
 
We next dropped 1,231 individuals with zero student loan balances at the time they entered their last 
repayment, with the last repayment period defined as starting 200 days after a borrower leaves school for the 
last time in our sample. The 200-day period between school completion and the beginning of the repayment 
period reflects the six-month grace period.15 Next, consistent with our discussion in Appendix A1 on 
reweighting the sample to adjust for underrepresentation of for-profit schools in the NSC sample, we 
dropped 226 borrowers who entered their last repayment period before fiscal year 1998, and for whom we 
cannot construct sample weights due to data limitations. 
 
Additionally, given that our analysis focused on borrowers’ delinquency outcomes five years after they 
entered repayment for the last time, we also dropped 3,582 borrowers who entered repayment for the last 
time after fiscal year 2006 and for whom we did not observe the outcome variable throughout the five-year 
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window. Furthermore, due to the very small sample and corresponding issues with weight adjustments, we 
dropped 34 individuals who last attended a private not-for-profit two-year school, as well as six individuals 
who last attended a private for-profit school in fiscal year 1998. Finally, we dropped five borrowers who 
entered their last repayment period before age 19 and additional 31 individuals with missing information on 
the CDR or school sector associated with the last institution attended. The final sample thus contains 6,651 
student loan borrowers with existing educational records. All dollar-nominated variables were deflated into 
2010 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). 
 
Table 1 shows the age distribution when entering repayment in our final sample. As shown, about 8% of 
student loan borrowers were age 21 or younger when entering repayment for the last time in the sample. 
These borrowers generally represent those with completed one- or two-year degrees, dropouts, or—in rare 
instances—very young four-year-degree college graduates. The next 42% of student loan borrowers with at 
least some college entered repayment for the last time between ages 22 and 24. The remaining 50%t entered 
their final repayment period between ages 25 and 33. These borrowers generally represent individuals with 
advanced degrees, as well as individuals who were either older when entering college or had longer or 
interrupted educational histories. 
 
Given the focus on credit variables as predictors of student loan delinquencies, Table 2 shows the 
distribution of credit scores by age of a student loan borrower.16 At least in theory, any individual with at 
least one credit tradeline account that is open for six months and reported to the credit bureau agency 
should have a credit score.17 To the extent that the need for credit increases with age, one would expect that 
the fraction of individuals with credit scores would increase with age. In our final sample, only 30% of 
individuals had a credit score at age 18, but 70% had a credit score by  
 
 
Table 1. Age Distribution when Entering the Last Repayment 
 
Age N Percent of Sample Cumulative 
19 85 1.28 1.28 
20 177 2.66 3.94 
21 267 4.01 7.95 
22 771 11.59 19.55 
23 1,100 16.54 36.08 
24 938 14.10 50.19 
25 787 11.83 62.02 
26 712 10.71 72.73 
27 567 8.53 81.25 
28 457 6.87 88.12 
29 308 4.63 92.75 
30 233 3.50 96.26 
31 150 2.26 98.51 
32 84 1.26 99.77 
33 15 0.23 100.00 
Total 6,651 100.00 100.00 
Note: The table captures the age distribution of student loan borrowers in our final 
sample at the time when these borrowers enter repayment for the last time in our sample. 
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Table 2. Credit Score Distribution by Age  
 
 
With No Credit Score  With Credit Score  Total 
Age Percent  Percent Mean SD  N 
18 72.4  27.6 645.5 101.6  2,559 
19 29.5  70.5 629.6 111.7  3,301 
20 17.5  82.5 612.3 133.0  3,765 
21 11.0  89.0 596.5 149.4  4,457 
22 6.9  93.1 583.4 157.7  4,790 
23 5.0  95.0 576.8 166.8  6,004 
24 3.8  96.2 569.8 170.5  5,226 
25 3.4  96.6 570.7 176.9  5,279 
26 2.4  97.6 566.8 180.8  5,187 
27 2.5  97.5 578.8 186.4  5,985 
28 1.8  98.2 585.5 185.9  5,146 
29 1.6  98.4 589.7 190.3  4,506 
30 1.5  98.5 592.0 189.8  3,922 
31 1.5  98.5 603.1 191.0  3,128 
32 2.3  97.7 599.6 193.0  2,218 
33 1.9  98.1 606.8 194.6  1,965 
34 1.7  98.3 602.0 196.2  1,355 
35 1.6  98.4 606.9 201.5  910 
Note: The table captures the fraction of individuals with no credit score in the final sample. For 
those with a credit score at a given age, it also reports the average (mean) credit score. Since 
borrowers are captured in our panel data at various ages, an individual who is observed at ages 18 
and 19, for example, will be included in the calculation of the mean credit score in both lines 1 and 
2 of the table. 
 
 
age 19, and 93% by age 22. For those aged 26 or above, close to 100% had a credit score. Moreover, the age 
profile of the average credit score for those with scores followed a U-shape. The average credit score started 
at about 650 at age 18 but—perhaps somewhat counter to initial intuition—declined monotonically by 
about 80 points to 567 at age 26 before rising again to about 600 at age 31. Additionally, the variance in 
credit score increased with age. Combined, the initial decline in the average credit score and the increasing 
variance suggest that while young borrowers start their credit histories as a relatively homogeneous group in 
terms of their observable credit characteristics, over time the scores become increasingly heterogeneous and, 
consequently, increasingly predictive in explaining future credit events—a fact that we will exploit in our 
analysis.  
 
Table 3 provides basic summary statistics for the final estimation sample. Out of the 6,651 individuals in 
our sample, 43.5% left school without a degree, with the remainder of the sample earning at least a 
certificate or an associate’s degree. Additionally, 47.3% were last associated with a public four-year 
institution. Moreover, 8.6% last attended a private for-profit institution and an additional 5.1% attended a 
for-profit institution at some point but not as their last school. On average, individuals entered their last 
repayment period with almost $22,000 in student loan debt (in constant 2010 dollars) on average, and 55.9% 
received a Pell Grant. Interestingly, the delinquency rate—defined as a borrower being at least 120 days past 
due within five years after entering the last repayment period in the sample—derived solely from credit  
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Table 3. Characteristics of Borrowers in the Final Sample  
 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Age at Last Repayment 6,651 25.4 2.8 19 33 
Highest Degree Attained      
Dropout 2,892 0.435    
Certificate/Associate's Degree 373 0.056    
Bachelor's 2,108 0.317    
Master's or Above 604 0.091    
Graduated but Degree Unknown 674 0.101    
Last Attended      
Public 4-year 3,143 0.473    
Public 2-year 1,375 0.207    
Private Not-for-profit 4-year 1,560 0.235    
Private For-profit 573 0.086    
Additional Sectors Attended  
(if Different from School Type Last Attended) 
Public 4-year 1,169 0.176    
Public 2-year 1,597 0.240    
Private Not-for-profit 4-year 797 0.120    
Private For-profit 340 0.051    
Ever Had (Prior to Entering Repayment) 
Auto Loans 2,393 0.360    
Mortgage Loans 836 0.126    
Credit Card Loans 5,284 0.794    
Ever Delinquent on  
(Prior to Entering Student Loan Repayment)  
Auto Loans 18 0.003    
Mortgage Loans 11 0.002    
Credit Card Loans 374 0.056    
Any Debt (different than student loans) 398 0.060    
Student Loans (in $1,000)      
Balance at Repayment 6,184 22.4 29.3 0.003 366.9 
With Student Loans but Missing Balance 467 0.3    
Fraction of Borrowers with Only Private Student Debt 129 0.0    
Pell Grants      
Ever Had 3,720 0.559    
Mean Pell Grants (>0, in $1,000) 3,720 2.3 1.0 0.4 4.31 
Credit Score (Prior to Leaving School)      
Credit Score 6,056 599.3 156.4 271 866 
Missing Credit Score Indicator 595 0.29    
Days Lagged (relating to timing of school exit) 6,056 376.7 198.0 1 731 
Cohort Default Rate 6,651 4.92 3.97 0 100 
Delinquency Rates by Repayment Calendar Year Cohort    
FY-1998 Cohort 285 0.272    
FY-1999 Cohort 453 0.249    
FY-2000 Cohort 511 0.296    
FY-2001 Cohort 660 0.225    
FY-2002 Cohort 734 0.253    
FY-2003 Cohort 882 0.261    
FY-2004 Cohort 1,031 0.265    
FY-2005 Cohort 1,082 0.247    
FY-2006 Cohort 1,013 0.266    
Overall 1,707 0.257    
Overall, Based on TransUnion Information 1,293 0.194    
Overall in Default on Their Federal Student Loans 1,094 0.164    
Note: Dollar-nominated variables are expressed in 2010 dollars using the CPI-U.  
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records is 19.4% in the sample. However, when the credit data is augmented with information on federal 
student loan defaults, this delinquency rate rises to 25.7%, suggesting that not all federal student loan 
defaults recorded by the U.S. Department of Education can be identified in the credit data.18 Moreover, 
among the 1,707 borrowers who became 120+ days past due on their student loans within five years after 
entering the last repayment period, 1,094 (or 64%) ended up defaulting on their federal student loans in 







This section summarizes several insightful bivariate relationships between student loan delinquencies and 
some of their correlates. Our delinquency measure takes a value of one if a borrower was ever 120 or more 
days delinquent within five years after entering the last repayment period, and takes a value of zero 
otherwise.19 
 
Table 4 and Figure 1 show the distribution of student loan balances for delinquent versus non-delinquent 
student loan borrowers. As can be seen, delinquent borrowers are, on average, associated with lower (rather 
that higher) student loan balances than non-delinquent borrowers. Since the results in Table 4 and Figure 1 
do not account for borrowers’ attained education, the negative coefficient on student loan debt should not 
be too surprising; those with lower educational attainment levels are more likely to become delinquent but, 
at the same time, tend to have lower levels of student loan debt. Table 5 illustrates this point by tabulating 
the average student loan debt and delinquency rate by the highest attained degree. The average delinquency 
rate and student loan balance among those who did not complete their degree are 43.5% and $12,524, 
compared to 6.8% and $48,260 of those with a master’s degree or above. To further illustrate this point, 
Figure 2 repeats the analysis shown in Figure 1 but separates borrowers by the highest degree attained. 
Indeed, once the highest degree attained is considered, the cumulative student loan balances associated with 




Table 4. Distribution of Student Loan Debt in the Final Sample, by Delinquency Status 
 
Student Loan Debt  
Not Delinquent  Delinquent 
% Cum. % Obs.  % Cum. % Obs. 
$0 – $10,000 34.7 34.7 1,595 
 
51.8 51.8 823 
$10,000 – $20,000 24.7 59.4 1,135 
 
21.1 72.9 335 
$20,000 – $30,000 17.9 77.3 821 
 
11.8 84.7 187 
$30,000 – $50,000 12.1 89.4 556 
 
9.4 94.1 150 
$50,000 – $75,000 5.4 94.7 246 
 
3.8 98.0 61 
More than $75,000 5.3 100.0 243 
 








Note: The table compares student loan balances between student loan borrowers who were never delinquent on their student 
loan debt against balances of borrowers who were delinquent on their student loan debt at some point in the sample. 467 
individuals with missing student loan balances (see Table 3) are dropped from this tabulation.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of student debt at repayment, by delinquency status. This figure plots the student loan 
density for balances below $50,000 by borrowers’ delinquency status. 
 
 
Table 5. Student Loan Balances and Delinquency Rate by Attained Degree 
 
Highest Degree Attained Average Student Loan Balances ($) Delinquency Rate 
No Degree 12,524 0.435 
Certificate/Associate’s Degree 12,307 0.228 
Bachelor’s Degree 24,133 0.111 
Master’s Degree or Above 48,260 0.068 
Note: The table tabulates average student loan balances by borrowers’ delinquency status and highest attained 
degree. Tabulations reflect the highest reported attained degree in the sample. 467 individuals with missing 
student loan balances (see Table 3) are dropped from this tabulation.  
 
 
Table 6 summarizes student loan delinquency rates by degree completion as well as the school sector last 
attended. The table shows that, not controlling for other factors, delinquency rates are generally much 
higher for those who did not complete a degree, irrespective of the sector attended. Still, even among this 
population, student loan borrowers who last attended a private for-profit school or a public two-year school 
are associated with relatively higher delinquency rates (54.3% and 46.4%, respectively) than borrowers who 
last attended a public four-year school (40.9%). The differences in delinquency rates are perhaps even more 
striking among those who earned a degree: 26.5% and 16.6% at private for-profit and public two-year 
schools versus 10.3% at public four-year schools.  
 
Finally, Table 7 shows the delinquency rate by borrowers’ credit score categories and their Pell Grant 
recipient status. To avoid the confounding effects of student loan repayment behavior on credit scores, a 
lagged credit score measure relative to school exit is used in the analysis. In particular, scores are lagged on 
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Figure 2: Distribution of student debt at repayment, by delinquency status. This figure repeats the analysis in 
Figure 1, but splits the student loan densities by borrowers’ highest attained degree. Plotted for student loan balances 
at last repayment below $50,000. 
 
 





With No Degree 
Sector Type Rate N 
 
Rate N 
Public 4-year 0.103 2,149 
 
0.409 994 
Public 2-year 0.166 361 
 
0.464 1,014 
Private 4-year, Not-for-profit 0.116 1,094 
 
0.328 466 
Private, for-profit 0.265 155 
 
0.543 418 
Total 0.119 3,759 
 
0.435 2,892 
Note: The table shows the student loan delinquency rate by school sector and degree completion. Tabulations are 
based on the most recent school sector affiliation. Individuals most recently affiliated with private 2-year not-




average by one year relative to school exit (as reported in Table 3), depending on when we observe 
TransUnion records and when the school exit occurs for each individual in our sample. Not controlling for 
other factors, the table shows that the likelihood of a student loan delinquency following the school exit 
declines monotonically and steeply with borrowers’ pre-school-exit credit scores. In particular, the 
delinquency rate for student loan borrowers with credit scores between 500 and 599 is 21 percentage points  
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Table 7. Delinquency Rate by Borrower Credit Score and Pell Grant Recipient Indicators 
 
Credit Score Average Student Loan Balances ($) Delinquency Rate Observations 
270-499 18,927 0.592 1,342 
500-599 22,504 0.301 935 
600-679 23,704 0.175 1,255 
680-729 27,454 0.090 808 
730-900 25,540 0.041 1,360 
Missing Score 11,372 0.341 484 
Ever Pell Grants Average Student Loan Balances ($) Delinquency Rate Observations 
No 25,226 0.152 2,723 
Yes 20,202 0.339 3,461 
Note: The table shows the distribution of student loan balances and delinquency rates by borrowers’ credit 
scores and Pell Grant status. Tabulations are based on borrowers’ credit scores that are on average lagged by 
one year relative to borrowers’ school exit. 467 individuals with missing student loan balances (see Table 3) are 
dropped from this tabulation. 
 
 
higher than for borrowers with credit scores between 680 and 729. Moreover, the table shows that Pell 
Grant recipients are significantly more likely to become delinquent on their student loans than those who 




In this section, we estimate a probability model (probit) of student loan delinquency on the estimation 
sample described in the Data section. The binary dependent variable corresponds to our delinquency 
measure defined in the Bivariate Analysis section. Columns (1) through (7) in Table 8 display the final 
estimation output for seven baseline regression specifications that are based on the entire sample. Columns 
(1) through (6) are adjusted for the NSC school type underrepresentation with FSA-based weights 
(discussed in Appendix A), while column (7) is unweighted. Column (8) restricts the analysis to those with a 
bachelor’s degree or less, also adjusting by the FSA-based weights. Coefficients in all regressions represent 
marginal effects, with the effects being evaluated at the means of the continuous variables. Standard errors 
are clustered at the school level.20 Columns (6) through (8) capture our preferred regression specifications.  
 
Column (1) provides estimates for the model with explanatory variables restricted to borrower’s age 
when entering the last repayment period, whether a borrower has received Pell Grants, the average amount 
of Pell Grants received, cumulative student loan balances when entering the last repayment period, and 
yearly time effects (with the time dummy variables taking on a value of one for the fiscal year in which a 
borrower entered his or her last repayment period). The omitted category is entering repayment in fiscal year 
1998. In line with the bivariate relationship shown in Figure 1, the negative and highly statistically significant 
regression coefficient on the (logged) student loan debt in Column (1) illustrates that, not controlling for 
additional factors such as degree attainment, borrowers delinquent on their student loan debt tend to be 
associated with significantly lower cumulative student loan balances than non-delinquent borrowers.21 This 
stylized finding challenges the popular press narrative that frequently links borrowers with high student loan 
debt burdens (and often advanced degrees) to student loan debt repayment difficulties. While such 
anecdotes undoubtedly capture repayment experiences of some borrowers, the data show that they are not 
generally representative of the typical student loan borrower experience.22 
 
Table 8. Probit Regression Output 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age at Last Repayment -0.146*** -0.0626* -0.0608* -0.0569* -0.0507 -0.0899** -0.0917*** -0.0740*
(1.86e-05) (0.0567) (0.0633) (0.0858) (0.131) (0.0109) (0.00286) (0.0741)
(Age at Last Repayment)^2 0.00262*** 0.00113* 0.00105* 0.000961 0.000907 0.00152** 0.00158*** 0.00116
(5.64e-05) (0.0702) (0.0900) (0.126) (0.155) (0.0233) (0.00718) (0.142)
Loan (Student Debt/1,000) -0.0377*** 2.88e-05 0.00686 0.00742 0.00672 0.00585 0.00904 0.00453
(1.01e-09) (0.996) (0.283) (0.251) (0.315) (0.383) (0.114) (0.576)
Ever Received Pell Grants -0.0200 -0.00124 0.0106 0.0134 0.0197 0.0112 0.0176 0.0168
(0.400) (0.957) (0.635) (0.550) (0.374) (0.609) (0.374) (0.523)
Avg. Pell Grants Received 0.0962*** 0.0704*** 0.0632*** 0.0596*** 0.0479*** 0.0356*** 0.0314*** 0.0398***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (3.61e-09) (1.66e-05) (2.32e-05) (7.03e-05)
Dropout 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.266*** 0.233*** 0.217*** 0.201*** 0.237***
(6.42e-07) (9.18e-07) (2.29e-06) (4.39e-05) (0.000139) (0.000146) (0.000144)
With Bachelor Degree -0.116*** -0.0838*** -0.0795** -0.0842*** -0.0701** -0.0706*** -0.0820**
(0.000116) (0.00926) (0.0139) (0.00759) (0.0313) (0.00866) (0.0308)
With Master’s Degree of More -0.131*** -0.107*** -0.0987*** -0.0966*** -0.0609 -0.0642**
(5.33e-05) (0.00246) (0.00604) (0.00644) (0.106) (0.0494)
With Degree (Type Unknown) -0.120*** -0.0980*** -0.0946*** -0.0980*** -0.0832** -0.0764**
(0.000401) (0.00605) (0.00869) (0.00615) (0.0301) (0.0121)
Architecture 0.127 0.115 0.119 0.103 0.0772 0.0698 0.129 
(0.287) (0.322) (0.309) (0.386) (0.491) (0.513) (0.342) 
Languages, Literatures, Arts 0.261*** 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.244*** 0.251*** 0.221*** 0.272*** 
(0.000143) (0.000182) (0.000193) (0.000456) (0.000508) (0.00105) (0.000945) 
Biology/Natural Sciences 0.129* 0.123* 0.127* 0.128* 0.152** 0.105 0.175** 
(0.0682) (0.0768) (0.0691) (0.0722) (0.0380) (0.108) (0.0338) 
Communications/Journalism 0.201** 0.195** 0.189** 0.174** 0.157* 0.129* 0.169* 
(0.0105) (0.0123) (0.0148) (0.0289) (0.0547) (0.0686) (0.0645) 
Computer Systems 0.0926 0.0791 0.0744 0.0891 0.105 0.0455 0.150 
(0.341) (0.414) (0.445) (0.371) (0.286) (0.568) (0.187) 
Notes: P-values in parentheses: * p<0.1, p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Dependent variable defined as ever 120+ days delinquent on student loan debt within 5 years after entering the last repayment period. The omitted variable categories are 
the “Fiscal Year 1998” for the year dummy, an “Associate’s Degree/Certificate” for college degree, “Engineering” for major, and “Last Attended Public, 4-year” for the 
last school sector attended.  continued on next page
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Table 8—Continued. Probit Regression Output
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Criminal Justice 0.222* 0.221* 0.209* 0.204* 0.237** 0.123 0.283** 
(0.0765) (0.0755) (0.0887) (0.0840) (0.0460) (0.227) (0.0275) 
Social Sciences 0.129** 0.126** 0.124** 0.118* 0.130** 0.100* 0.163** 
(0.0344) (0.0380) (0.0389) (0.0564) (0.0418) (0.0857) (0.0287) 
Education 0.123* 0.124* 0.119* 0.122* 0.137** 0.117* 0.109 
(0.0573) (0.0520) (0.0608) (0.0626) (0.0410) (0.0631) (0.199) 
Business 0.0262 0.0173 0.0129 0.0213 0.0226 -0.00550 0.0335 
(0.649) (0.760) (0.818) (0.712) (0.698) (0.917) (0.628) 
Health Professions 0.0808 0.0805 0.0769 0.0851 0.118* 0.0984 0.156* 
(0.208) (0.210) (0.227) (0.195) (0.0821) (0.115) (0.0524) 
Legal Professions 0.224** 0.226** 0.226** 0.216** 0.239** 0.179*
(0.0317) (0.0300) (0.0296) (0.0365) (0.0208) (0.0559)
Public Administration 0.212*** 0.215*** 0.207** 0.195** 0.168** 0.134* 0.159 
(0.00812) (0.00820) (0.0102) (0.0186) (0.0293) (0.0682) (0.137) 
Liberal Arts/Sciences 0.190** 0.212*** 0.202*** 0.175** 0.174** 0.163** 0.187** 
(0.0140) (0.00688) (0.00990) (0.0280) (0.0358) (0.0373) (0.0445) 
Personal/Culinary Services 0.184*** 0.162*** 0.157*** 0.146** 0.151** 0.113** 0.179** 
(0.00218) (0.00592) (0.00711) (0.0151) (0.0132) (0.0402) (0.0120) 
Last Attended Public, 2-year 0.0539*** 0.0151 -0.00185 -0.0117 -0.0172 -0.0179
(0.00737) (0.472) (0.928) (0.564) (0.339) (0.443)
Last Attended Private, Not-for-profit -0.0102 -0.00277 -0.00433 0.000379 0.00217 -0.00300
(0.577) (0.878) (0.809) (0.983) (0.893) (0.887)
Last Attended Private, For-profit 0.111*** 0.0638** 0.0306 8.77e-07 -0.00843 -0.0104
(6.67e-06) (0.0124) (0.221) (1.000) (0.706) (0.720)
Ever Attended Public, 4-year -0.0203 -0.0190 -0.0124 -0.0139 -0.0176 -0.0251
(0.321) (0.353) (0.549) (0.493) (0.282) (0.308)
Ever Attended Public, 2-year -0.0182 -0.0179 -0.0107 -0.0105 0.000999 -0.0126
(0.271) (0.276) (0.509) (0.517) (0.944) (0.516)
Notes: P-values in parentheses: * p<0.1, p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Dependent variable defined as ever 120+ days delinquent on student loan debt within 5 years after entering the last repayment period. The omitted variable categories are 
the “Fiscal Year 1998” for the year dummy, an “Associate’s Degree/Certificate” for college degree, “Engineering” for major, and “Last Attended Public, 4-year” for the 
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Table 8—Continued. Probit Regression Output 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ever Attended Private, Not-for-profit -0.00248 0.000840 0.00707 0.000797 0.00235 0.00954 
(0.896) (0.965) (0.716) (0.968) (0.890) (0.688) 
Ever Attended Private, For-profit 0.0674** 0.0717*** 0.0655** 0.0399 0.0270 0.0482 
(0.0111) (0.00695) (0.0150) (0.134) (0.260) (0.110) 
CDR (Lagged by 3 Years) 0.00997*** 0.00840*** 0.00603*** 0.00721*** 0.00707*** 
(3.54e-06) (4.43e-05) (0.00246) (5.32e-05) (0.00198) 
With Mortgage Debt -0.106*** -0.0676*** -0.0522*** -0.0622**
(1.66e-08) (0.00147) (0.00337) (0.0236)
With Credit Card Debt -0.159*** -0.0849*** -0.0957*** -0.0854***
(0) (7.95e-07) (8.51e-11) (1.16e-05)
With Auto Debt -0.000845 0.00632 0.00506 -0.00550
(0.951) (0.643) (0.661) (0.736)
Delinquent on Other Debt 0.168*** 0.00905 0.00876 -0.00553
(5.98e-10) (0.710) (0.694) (0.843)
Lagged Loan (Credit Score) -0.447*** -0.426*** -0.492***
(0) (0) (0) 
Missing Credit Score Indicator -0.627*** -0.505*** -0.731***
(0) (0) (0) 
Missing Student Loan Debt -0.230*** -0.0299 0.0223 0.0275 0.00442 -0.0130 -0.0185 -0.0217
(1.13e-08) (0.609) (0.723) (0.666) (0.945) (0.836) (0.729) (0.769)
Missing Major Information 0.302*** 0.298*** 0.288*** 0.278*** 0.268*** 0.218***
(0.000221) (0.000251) (0.000389) (0.000873) (0.00207) (0.00577)
Time Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,651 6,651 6,651 6,651 6,651 6,651 6,651 5,362 
Pseudo R2 0.0879 0.161 0.168 0.173 0.204 0.261 0.270 0.237 
Notes: P-values in parentheses: * p<0.1, p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Dependent variable defined as ever 120+ days delinquent on student loan debt within 5 years after entering the last repayment period. The omitted variable categories are 
the “Fiscal Year 1998” for the year dummy, an “Associate’s Degree/Certificate” for college degree, “Engineering” for major, and “Last Attended Public, 4-year” for the 
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The Federal Pell Grant program is a means-tested program that offers financial aid to low-income 
students. The program is large: Total Pell expenditures for the school year 2013-14 are estimated at about 
$34 billion, with over one-third of undergraduate students receiving a Pell Grant in that year (College Board, 
n.d.; 2015). While the indicator for Pell Grant recipients is not statistically significant on its own, the average 
amount of Pell Grants received—itself a function of family resources for dependent students and their own 
resources for students who are independent, as well as enrollment intensity and educational expenses—is 
highly significant and positively correlated with future student loan delinquency at a 1% level. While the 
economic significance falls when additional controls are included in the regressions in Columns (2) through 
(8), the statistical significance is unchanged, suggesting that borrowers from underprivileged socioeconomic 
backgrounds are significantly more likely to become delinquent on their student loan debt.  
 
Column (2) adds information on attained degrees and college majors, with the omitted categories being 
an associate’s degree/certificate for degrees, and engineering for majors.23,24 A comparison of coefficients in 
Columns (1) and (2) illustrates the important role of degree completion as a correlate of future student loan 
delinquencies. When educational controls are added in Column (2), the college dropout indicator becomes 
the most economically significant predictor of future student loan delinquency.25 In contrast, having a 
degree beyond an associate’s degree or a certificate mitigates delinquency risk. Additionally, when schooling 
variables are included in the regression, the effect of the average Pell Grants received drops by roughly a 
third (although it remains statistically significant at a 1% level), largely because Pell Grant controls are 
positively correlated with the dropout indicator. Indeed, Pell Grant recipients are more frequently associated 
with socioeconomic characteristics and educational experiences that suggest statistically greater chances of 
dropping out of college (Wei and Horn, 2002; 2009).26 Importantly, once educational controls are added, 
student loan debt becomes positively correlated with student loan delinquency risk. However, the estimated 
partial correlation between student loan debt and delinquency is economically small and statistically 
insignificant, and this result holds even as additional controls are added in Columns (3) through (8). This 
weak correlation between student loan balances and delinquency odds reflects that student loan balances, 
once educational backgrounds are considered, are a poor predictor of student loan delinquency risk.  
 
For majors, all the coefficients are positive, indicating that among those with an attained degree, 
engineering majors are less likely to become delinquent on their student debt than other majors, and several 
of these coefficients are significant at standard significance levels.27 
 
Column (3) incorporates information on school sectors: public two-year, public four-year, private four-
year not-for-profit, and private for-profit. Individual educational histories are often complicated. While 
some borrowers attend only one sector, many borrowers attend multiple sectors through a series of lateral, 
upward, or downward moves. Therefore, besides controlling for the school sector with which a borrower 
was most recently associated (with public four-year schools being the omitted sector), we also control for other 
school sectors previously attended.28,29Consistent with the bivariate evidence in Table 6, having both last or 
ever attended a for-profit institution is positively and significantly associated with higher delinquency risk at 
1% and 5% significance levels, respectively, even after controlling for several other factors. Similarly, 
attending a public two-year institution just before entering the last repayment period is also positively 
associated with future student loan delinquency risk.30 
 
Column (4) adds information on school-level two-year cohort default rates (CDR) for the last institution 
attended. The CDR is a metric constructed by the U.S. Department of Education and it is mainly used to 
sanction schools with high student loan default rates. If the school’s CDR exceeds a given threshold, the 
school becomes Title IV ineligible for a time, thereby losing access to federal grants and student loans.31 
While the CDR of the last institution attended is likely to be highly correlated with a borrower’s own future 
student loan delinquency odds, in the context of our “predictive” exercise it is interesting to quantify its 
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predictive power for individual delinquency, in part because CDRs are readily available to the U.S. 
Department of Education.  
 
To be consistent with CDR information that might be available to the U.S. Department of Education at 
the moment when the borrower enters repayment, and to avoid contaminating the CDR by the borrower’s 
own delinquency behavior, we lag the school-level CDR by three years with respect to the year in which the 
borrower enters his or her last repayment period. Not surprisingly, the school CDR is highly predictive of 
individual future student loan delinquency. Moreover, introducing this measure takes power away from the 
school sector coefficients. In particular, the statistical significance of attending a public two-year institution 
just before entering the last repayment period dissipates and the value of the coefficient drops by roughly 
two-thirds, while the economic importance of attending a private for-profit school just before entering 
repayment decreases almost by a half. The reduction in the predictive power of the last school sector 
attended variables once the CDR is included is due to the combination of two factors. First, there is a 
significant correlation between school sectors and CDRs, as reflected in Figure 3. Second, even among the 
sectors where delinquencies are prevalent, there is significant heterogeneity in CDRs among schools within 
those sectors, which is why the CDR is a better predictor of future student loan delinquencies than a more 
generic indicator for school sector. 
 
Column (5) includes a first subset of credit variables. More specifically, the regression controls for 
whether the borrower had other types of debt (i.e., auto, mortgage, and credit card debt) just before entering 
repayment, and whether the borrower was delinquent on any debt different from student loans prior to 
entering repayment. Interestingly, having credit card and mortgage debt before entering repayment is 
associated with a lower likelihood of future student loan delinquencies, while having auto debt is statistically 
insignificant. The lower incidence of student loan delinquencies among those with mortgage or credit card 
debt prior to entering repayment might in part reflect that borrowers with less risky underlying credit 
profiles might be more likely to qualify for such debts while in school. Simultaneously, the statistical 
insignificance of having auto debt prior to entering repayment might reflect that auto debt is generally more 
widely available to borrowers with less pristine credit records than other types of debt. Finally, being 
delinquent on other types of debt prior to entering repayment is highly correlated with future student loan 
delinquency odds.  
 
Our preferred regression specification in Column (6) includes (logged) credit scores. As described in the 
Bivariate Analysis section, credit scores are lagged relative to the school exit. Finally, a dummy variable set to 
unity for those with missing credit scores (zero otherwise) is included.32 Once credit variables are introduced 
in Columns (5) and (6), the economic effects associated with dropping out and Pell Grants received decline 
in value (although they remain significant), suggesting that credit variables—and credit scores in particular—
are correlated with degree completion and socioeconomic backgrounds. At the same time, lagged credit 
score becomes the most economically predictive correlate of student loan delinquency odds. The highly 
predictive nature of lagged credit scores, coupled with the low predictive power of student loan debt, 
supports the notion that the observed rise in student loan delinquencies may not, in general, be driven by 
large levels of student loan debt, but rather by other factors that correlate with a borrower’s ability to repay 
(see, for example, Dynarski and Kreisman, 2013; Hillman, 2014; and Hylands, 2014).33 Finally, turning to the 
effect of other delinquencies, not surprisingly, being delinquent on other types of debt before entering 
repayment becomes insignificant when introducing the credit score prior to leaving school. Although the 
effects of having a mortgage and credit card debt remain significant, part of the effect is absorbed by the 
credit score.  
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Figure 3. Distribution of school sector CDRs by last sector attended. The figure shows kernel densities of the 
cohort default rate (CDR) by school sectors. 
 
 
Column (7) shows the unweighted estimates presented in Column (6), while column (8) estimates the 
model on a subsample of borrowers with at most a bachelor’s degree. As can be seen, the estimates and 
their statistical significance are largely unchanged. To illustrate the economic and statistical relevance of 
credit scores, Figure 4 compares the estimated relationship between credit scores (measured prior to 
entering the last repayment period) and the student loan delinquency probability for a bachelor’s degree 
holder and a college dropout at a public four-year school, holding other observable characteristics 
constant.34 As shown, the predicted probability of becoming delinquent on student loans after entering 
repayment is significantly higher for those leaving school without a degree across the credit score spectrum. 
The differential effect ranges from about 10 percentage points for high-credit-score borrowers to 40 
percentage points for low-credit-score borrowers. Notably, having no credit score prior to leaving school in 
our sample is not synonymous with a low score. Observationally, borrowers without scores are about as 
likely to become delinquent on their student debt as their counterparts with a score of 575.  
 
In the same vein, Figure 5 captures the estimated ceteris paribus correlation between student loan 
balances and the delinquency risk for borrowers with a 700 and 550 credit score, respectively.35 As 
illustrated, and consistent with our previous discussion, the economic contribution of student loan debt 
plays only a relatively small role in predicting future delinquency and is only imprecisely estimated. In 
particular, the predicted probability of future student loan delinquency is relatively flat across the student 
loan debt spectrum, with sizable 90% confidence intervals bounding the estimated effects, indicating the 
limited usefulness of student loan balances in identifying borrowers in high risk of future student loan 
delinquency.36 
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Predictive Power and Policy Implications 
 
In this section, we assess the in-sample ability of our preferred specification in Column (6) to identify 
borrowers in high risk of becoming delinquent on their student loans within five years after entering their 
last repayment period—our dependent variable. To this end, we construct cumulative delinquency curves, 
which are an analytical metric commonly used in the mortgage industry to gauge performance of credit risk 
statistical models. First, we use our model to predict the probability of becoming delinquent on student 
loans for each borrower. Second, we calculate the cumulative delinquency curve, defined as a function L(P), 
where P (represented by the horizontal axis) is the cumulative portion of the population ranked by 
delinquency risk in a descending order, and L (represented by the vertical axis) is the cumulative portion of 




Figure 4. Probability of student loan delinquency, by credit score. This figure plots the estimated probability of 
student loan delinquency in five years following the last school exit (vertical axis) for individuals with varying credit 
scores (horizontal axis) who did not complete a degree (red line) and for those with a bachelor’s degree (blue line). 
The shaded regions show the 90% confidence bands around the point estimates. Calculations assume that the 
borrower entered repayment in fiscal year 2005 at the age of 25, attended only a public four-year school with an 
average (5%) CDR, and received a bachelor’s degree in business, management, or marketing. Moreover, the borrower 
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Figure 5. Probability of student loan delinquency, by student loan balance. Calculations assume that the 
borrower entered repayment in fiscal year 2005 at the age of 25, only attended a public four-year school with an 
average (5%) CDR, and received a bachelor’s degree in business, management, or marketing. Moreover, the borrower 
did not receive any Pell Grants, had a credit score of 700 or 550 (respectively) prior to entering last repayment, and 
had no other debt. Shaded regions represent 90% confidence intervals. 
 
 
The black line in Figure 6 tracks a perfect prediction for our sample and shows that roughly 25% of 
borrowers become delinquent on their student loans in our sample. Theoretically, a perfect model would 
assign these borrowers the highest predicted probability of student loan delinquency and would thus allot 
them to the bottom quartile of the population ranked by the delinquency risk in descending order, P. In 
practice, an estimated model is unlikely to fit the perfect prediction line exactly. However, the model’s fit 
relative to the perfect prediction provides a gauge for assessing how well the model separates borrowers in 
high risk of student loan delinquency from their lower risk counterparts. Figure 6 shows that our fully 
specified model (represented by the red line) captures 60% of all student loan delinquencies among the 
riskiest 25% of student loan borrowers ranked by the model-predicted delinquency risk (relative to a 100% 
of all delinquencies under the perfect prediction). Furthermore, the bottom 15% and 30% of riskiest 
borrowers (as predicted by the model) account for 40% and 70% of all student loan delinquencies, 
respectively. While our results point to the fact that a significant amount of heterogeneity related to student 
loan repayment behavior exists even after controlling for the available observable characteristics, we view 
the ability of our model to capture an appreciable amount of student loan delinquencies in the bottom tail of 
the predicted risk distribution as encouraging.  
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Figure 6. Cumulative delinquency distribution, by model-predicted student loan delinquency risk. The figure 
shows cumulative delinquency curves, defined by the function L(P), where P (represented by the horizontal axis) is 
the cumulative portion of the population ranked by delinquency risk in a descending order, and L (represented by the 
vertical axis) is the cumulative portion of student loan delinquencies in the sample. The black line tracks a perfect 
prediction for our sample and shows that roughly 25% of borrowers become delinquent on their student loans in our 
sample. The model’s fit relative to the perfect prediction/black line provides a gauge for assessing how well the model 
separates borrowers in a high risk of student loan delinquency from their lower-risk counterparts. For example, the 
fully specified model (represented by the red line) captures 60% of all student loan delinquencies among the riskiest 
25% of student loan borrowers ranked by the model-predicted delinquency risk (relative to a 100% of all 
delinquencies under the perfect prediction). Furthermore, the bottom 15% and 30% of riskiest borrowers (as 
predicted by the model) account for 40% and 70% of all student loan delinquencies, respectively. 
 
 
At this point, it is helpful to compare the predictions of our preferred model against alternative models 
that could be used by the U.S. Department of Education to target borrowers in high risk of student loan 
delinquency after entering repayment. In particular, the U.S. Department of Education has a number of 
initiatives through which it attempts to reach student loan borrowers who might benefit from enrolling in 
income-driven repayment plans. Unfortunately, only a limited number of early indicators of student loan 
non-performance are currently available to the U.S. Department of Education to help identify these 
borrowers, such as high student loan balances.37 Thus, the figure also shows the explanatory power of 
several (simpler) alternative models that could be potentially adopted by the U.S. Department of Education 
to predict future delinquency risk. As illustrated, a model that uses only student loan balances—the blue 
line—closely tracks a 45-degree line and, as such, is associated with a minimal explanatory power. The green 
line shows a version of the model that complements student loan balances with additional information 
potentially readily available to the U.S. Department of Education: the two-year school cohort default rates 
and Pell Grants controls.38 Including such information greatly improves the fit of the model over the 
specification that exclusively relies on student loan balances; however, even such specification is far inferior 
in terms of its in-sample predictive power to our preferred specification.  
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Given the statistically and economically significant effect of credit scores in our preferred specification, it 
is interesting to explore whether augmenting the above regressions (which only control for risk factors 
currently observable by the U.S. Department of Education) might appreciably increase the models’ 
predictive power. The purple line captures the predictive power of a re-estimated model that only includes 
student loan balances and credit scores (measured prior to a borrower’s entering repayment). Introducing 
borrowers’ credit scores greatly improves the model’s performance relative to the specifications that rely 
exclusively on student loan balances, as well as student loan balances, CDRs, and Pell Grant controls. 
Moreover, once credit scores are introduced, a further inclusion of CDRs and Pell Grants—in addition to 
student loan balances and credit scores (the orange line)—leads only to a marginal improvement in the 
predictive power of the model and has essentially no discernible effect on the model’s ability to predict 
student loan delinquencies at the bottom of the risk distribution where the efficiency gains of an 
improvement in predictive power would be the greatest.  
 
Taken together, our results suggest that individuals’ credit scores are a potent predictor of student loan 
delinquency risk. Moreover, once credit scores are included, the contribution of CDRs and Pell Grant 
controls to the model’s explanatory power is somewhat limited. Indeed, once we include credit scores, even 
the most rudimentary regression specification that relies exclusively on student loan balances and credit 
score performs comparably to our preferred, fully specified model. In particular, a simple model that 
includes only student loan balances and credit scores captures about 57% of all student loan delinquencies 
among the bottom quartile of the riskiest borrowers, essentially the same fraction as the fully specified 






The increase in student loan delinquencies and defaults in recent data, coupled with increased borrowing 
volumes, have raised concerns about students’ ability to repay their student loan debt obligations. 
Coinciding with these increases, the U.S. Department of Education introduced new income-driven 
repayment plans to help borrowers lower monthly payments to manageable levels relative to their incomes. 
While enrollment in and general awareness of these programs have been on the rise, efficient targeting of 
borrowers who might benefit from these plans appears to have been difficult, in part due to data 
limitations.39 This paper contributes to the literature on predictors of student loan delinquency, with a novel 
application to credit bureau data. 
 
Using new and unique data, we build a series of statistical models designed to predict the probability that 
individual borrowers become delinquent on their student loans within the first five years after entering the 
last repayment period. We show that, unlike student loan balances, individual credit scores are highly 
predictive of future student loan delinquencies, even when measured well before borrowers enter 
repayment. In particular, even the most rudimentary probit specification that controls only for student loan 
balances and lagged credit scores captures about 60% of all student loan delinquencies in the sample among 
the model-predicted riskiest quartile of the student loan borrower distribution. In contrast, a specification 
based solely on student loan balances—a risk factor that, in absence of other viable alternatives, is readily 
available to the U.S. Department of Education—is associated with minimal explanatory power and is, 
therefore, of minimal use for achieving the objective of efficient targeting.  
 
Our findings have practical implications. First, exploiting borrower credit information could vastly 
improve the efficacy of the borrower-targeting process. Second, our analysis used credit scores that were 
significantly lagged relative to the borrowers’ last repayment entry in order to avoid confounding feedback 
effects of repayment behavior on observed credit controls. Practically, using the most recent credit score 
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available at the moment of targeting is likely to boost the targeting’s effectiveness relative to our results. 
While credit scores are generally not available to the U.S. Department of Education, they could be 
potentially acquired by making borrowers sign a credit score disclosure form when applying for a loan. 
Incorporating such a disclosure into the standard student loan application process could thus provide the 
U.S. Department of Education with the ability to access borrowers’ credit scores at a future time, when 
these borrowers exit school or enter repayment. As discussed in the introduction, our analysis is not designed 
nor should it be interpreted as suggesting that credit scores be used for student loan underwriting; doing so 
could undermine the objective of equalizing college access opportunities.  
 
 
Nexus: Connecting Research to Practice 
• Student loan delinquencies do not appear to be driven by high levels of student loan debt, 
but rather by other factors that affect borrowers’ ability to repay it. In particular, 
borrowers who leave school without a college degree are disproportionately more likely to 
become delinquent on their student loans, although their student loan burdens are on 
average relatively low. In marked contrast, graduate degree holders, while generally 
associated with sizable student loan debt, rarely become delinquent on their student loans. 
• Attending a for-profit institution, with or without completing a degree, is associated with 
disproportionately greater risk of future student loan delinquency. 
• A borrower’s credit score (even when measured at a time that precedes the borrower’s 
entry into student loan repayment) is highly predictive of future student loan delinquencies 
and is correlated with both degree non-completion and for-profit attendance. In part, this 
might reflect that borrowers with low credit scores at the time of their entry into 
repayment tend to be less likely to have a degree and are more likely to have attended a 
for-profit institution. 
• Our analysis suggests that borrowers’ credit scores observed at or shortly before school 
exit, if made available to program administrators, could be used very effectively to target 
borrowers for enrollment in programs designed to mitigate delinquency risk. 
• Our analysis is not designed to, nor should it be interpreted to, suggest the use of credit 
scores for student loan underwriting; doing so could undermine the objective of equalizing 
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Appendix A 
 
The Data Set 
 
Our data set pools data from several sources.40 The data set starts with a nationally representative random 
sample of credit bureau records picked and provided by TransUnion, LLC, for a cohort of 34,891 young 
individuals who were between ages 23 and 31 in 2004, and spans the period 1997 through 2010. Individuals 
were followed biannually between June 1997 and June 2003, and then in December 2004, June 2007, and 
December 2008 and 2010. The data set contains all major credit bureau variables, including credit scores, 
tradeline debt levels, and delinquency and severe derogatory records.  
 
In order to capture information on enrollment periods and the institutional-level characteristics 
associated with each period, in the next step we sourced individual educational records through 2007 from 
the DegreeVerify (for degrees) and Student Tracker (for enrollments) programs by the National Student 
Clearinghouse (NSC). The NSC educational institution identifiers allow us to further merge institutional 
records from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), such as tuition, sector (e.g., 
public, private for-profit and not-for-profit, open admission), and SAT and ACT scores that are 
summarized at a school level. In addition, the NSC school identifiers allow us to also merge the historical 
school-level two-year cohort default rates (CDR) collected by the U.S. Department of Education Federal 
Student Aid (FSA). Finally, for Federal Pell Grant and federal student loan recipients, individual-level 
information about Federal Pell Grants and federal student loans—sourced from the National Student Loan 
Data System (NSLDS)—is merged onto the data.  
 
Given that only a subset of individuals in the core TransUnion sample have existing postsecondary 
education records, there are important differences between the TransUnion sample and its NSC subsample. 
As illustrated in Table A1, out of the 34,891 individuals in the TransUnion sample, 54% (or 18,748 
individuals) have an existing NSC postsecondary education enrollment record. While this college-going rate 
broadly matches the comparable rate of 58% in the nationally representative American Community Survey 
(ACS) 2007 public files, it understates the rate slightly.41 In particular, besides never enrolling in college, a 
NSC record might be missing because the postsecondary education institution in which an individual was/is 
enrolled does not participate in the NSC Student Tracker or DegreeVerify programs (see Dynarski et al., 
2013).42 To the extent that the NSC program participation issues could be systematic, it is helpful to next 
examine the differences in baseline variables between the two samples.  
 
Turning to the differences in credit data indicators between the two samples, individuals represented in 
the NSC subsample are more frequently associated with student loan balances (62.8% versus 44.5% in the 
core TransUnion sample) as well as other types of debt, including auto debt (77.7% versus 72.8%), 
mortgage debt (50.8% versus 44.4%), and credit card debt (95.5% versus 87.9%). Mostly in line with our 
expectations, 120 or more days past due delinquency rates on auto and mortgage debt are lower in the NSC 
(or college-going) subsample but, perhaps surprisingly, are higher for credit card debt: 1.1% versus 1.5% for 
auto loans, 4.3% versus 5.0% for mortgages, and 13.3% versus 12.7% for credit card debt. Consistent with 
these findings, the average maximum credit score per borrower is 36 points greater in the NSC subsample 
than in the core credit bureau data (712 versus 676). Taken together, the observed differences are in line 
with those one would expect when comparing the population with a subsample of individuals with at least 
some postsecondary education.  
 
Diving deeper into the potential systematic bias due to reporting issues, we next turn to the group of 
3,760 borrowers (or fully 24% of all student loan borrowers in our sample) who have existing student loan 
debt records in the credit bureau files and/or student loan records in the NSLDS, but do not have NSC 
records. Comparing the characteristics of these borrowers (shown in Table A2) with characteristics of  
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Table A1. Comparison of the Core Sample with the National Student Loan Clearinghouse (NSC) 
Subsample 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Age in 2004      
All 34,891 27.5 2.6 23 31 
NSC 18,748 27.2 2.5 23 31 
Ever Attended      
Public 4-year (All) 11,022 0.316    
Public 2-year (All) 11,805 0.338    
Private 4-year Not-for-profit (All) 5,656 0.162    
Private For-profit (All) 4,025 0.115    
Private 2-year Not-for-profit (All) 336 0.010    
Public 4-year (NSC) 9,643 0.514    
Public 2-year (NSC) 10,331 0.551    
Private 4-year Not-for-profit (NSC) 4,275 0.228    
Private For-profit (NSC) 955 0.051    
Private 2-year Not-for-profit (NSC) 120 0.006    
Public 4-year (NSC/NSLDS) 10,252 0.547    
Public 2-year (NSC/NSLDS) 10,765 0.574    
Private 4-year Not-for-profit (NSC/NSLDS) 5,055 0.270    
Private For-profit (NSC/NSLDS) 2,245 0.120    
Private 2-year Not-for-profit (NSC/NSLDS) 228 0.012    
Highest Degree Attained      
Dropout 10,337 0.551    
Associate’s or Certificate 997 0.053    
Bachelor’s 4,338 0.231    
Master’s or More 1,217 0.065    
With Degree, but Level Unknown 1,859 0.099    
Ever Had      
Student Debt (All) 15,526 0.445    
Auto Debt (All) 25,416 0.728    
Mortgage Debt (All) 15,497 0.444    
Credit Card Debt (All) 30,683 0.879    
Student Debt (NSC) 11,766 0.628    
Auto Debt (NSC) 14,558 0.777    
Mortgage Debt (NSC) 9,528 0.508    
Credit Card Debt (NSC) 17,897 0.955    
Ever Delinquent on      
Student Debt (All) 4,643 0.299    
Auto Debt (All) 527 0.021    
Mortgage Debt (All) 1,736 0.112    
Credit Card Debt (All) 4,439 0.145    
Student Debt (NSC) 3,207 0.273    
Auto Debt (NSC) 210 0.014    
continued on next page 
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Table A1—Continued. Comparison of the Core Sample with the NSC Subsample 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Mortgage Debt (All) 1,736 0.112    
Credit Card Debt (All) 4,439 0.145    
Student Debt (NSC) 3,207 0.273    
Auto Debt (NSC) 210 0.014    
Mortgage Debt (NSC) 800 0.084    
Credit Card Debt (NSC) 2,489 0.139       
Pell Grants      
Ever Had Pell Grants (All) 11,191 0.321    
Mean Pell Grants (All) 11,191 2,542.2 1,017.3 400 4,310 
Ever had Pell Grants (NSC) 8,453 0.451    
Mean Pell Grants (NSC) 8,453 2,491.3 1,013.7 400 4,310 
Maximum Level of Debt in Sample (in 2010 dollars, in thousands) 
Student Debt (All) 14,522 26.6 35.2 0.001 438.6 
Auto Debt (All) 23,370 22.5 15.9 0.048 528.8 
Mortgage Debt (All) 15,069 212.9 175.5 0.016 3,976.3 
Credit Card Debt (All) 27,172 6.8 9.2 0.000 253.7 
Student Debt (NSC) 11,240 29.9 37.5 0.001 438.6 
Auto Debt (NSC) 13,632 22.0 14.8 0.067 528.8 
Mortgage Debt (NSC) 9,355 228,2 177.6 2.704 3,976.3 
Credit Card Debt (NSC) 16,756 7.4 9.4 0.000 253.7 
Maximum Credit Score in Sample      
All 33,950 670.7 136.9 271 897 
NSC 18,641 706.6 124.5 276 897 
Not in NSC, with Student Debt 3,725 628.3 141.6 271 887 
Students in Delinquency Status      
All 4,643 0.299    
Based on TransUnion Information (All) 3,486 0.225    
In Default on Federal Student Loans (All) 2,858 0.184    
NSC 3,207 0.273    
Based on TransUnion Information (NSC) 2,488 0.211    
In Default on Federal Student Loans (NSC) 1,912 0.163       
 
 
student loan borrowers with existing NSC records (shown in Table A1) provides the best available gauge of 
the type of bias posed in our data set by the NSC reporting issues. As can be seen, in our sample student 
loan borrowers without NSC records tend to be slightly older than those with existing NSC records (27.9 
versus 27.5 years old), are more likely to be Pell Grant recipients (52.3% versus 45.1%), and are associated 
with greater average Pell Grant balances ($2,679 versus $2,491).43 Also, individuals with student debt but no 
NSC records are significantly less likely to have mortgage debt (40.3% versus 50.8%), credit card debt 
(88.8% versus 95.5%) or auto debt (75.8% versus 77.7%). With the exception of auto debt holdings (which 
are, on average, slightly higher for this group), debt holdings of borrowers with no NSC records are lower 
on balance relative to the student loan borrowers with NSC records. 
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Table A2: Characteristics of Borrowers with Student Loan Debt but No NSC Records 
 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
Age in 2004 3,760 27.9 2.6 23 31 
Credit Score 3,725 628.3 141.6 271 887 
Pell Grants 
Ever Had  1,968 0.523    
Mean Pell Grants 1,968 2,679.2 1,037.7 400 4,310 
Ever Had 
Student Debt 3,760 1    
Auto Debt 2,851 0.758    
Mortgage Debt 1,514 0.403    
Credit Card Debt  3,340 0.888       
Ever Delinquent on 
Student Debt  1,436 0.382    
Auto Debt  86 0.023    
Mortgage Debt  215 0.057    
Credit Card Debt 538 0.143       
Maximum Level of Debt (in 2010 dollars, in thousands) 
Student Debt  3,282 15.3 22.4 0.001 371 
Auto Debt 2,583 22.6 16.3 0.222 173 
Mortgage Debt  1,450 199.0 163.5 0.223 1,581 
Credit Card Debt  2,774 6.6 9.6 0.000 186 
Students in Delinquency Status 
Overall 1,436 0.382    
Based on TransUnion Information 999 0.266    
In Default on Federal Student Loans  946 0.252       
 
 
Additionally, student loan borrowers with no NSC records are more likely to become delinquent on their 
student loan debt after entering repayment (38.2% versus 27.3%), and are also more frequently delinquent 
on their other debt before they start repaying their student loans (3.0% versus 1.4% for auto debt, 14.2% 
versus 8.4% for mortgage debt, and 24% versus 13.9% for credit card debt). Finally, the average credit score 
for this subsample is about 80 points lower. Given the salient determinants of student loan delinquency 
(described in the Conclusions section) and also consistent with the lower student loan delinquency rate in 
the NSC subsample (shown in Tables A2 and A3), the existing differences in these indicators point to a 
possible attenuation bias in our results stemming from the elimination of student loan borrowers with no 
NSC records from our final estimation sample. The existing differences are, in part, caused by systematic 
differences in NSC coverage by school type, wherein institutions associated with a riskier credit profile of 
student loan borrowers (such as private for-profit schools) are underrepresented in the earlier years of the 
NSC coverage.  
 
To address the NSC coverage issues, we proceed in two steps. First, whenever available, we augment the 
NSC enrollment information with enrollment data from the NSLDS for federal student loan recipients.44 
Second, we develop yearly sample weights designed to correct for the underrepresentation of certain school 
sectors in the NSC data. Panels A and B in Table A3 show the yearly shares of borrowers entering 
repayment across school sectors in our NSC sample and the nationally representative FSA data, 
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respectively.45 For each sector, the weights are constructed as the ratio of these yearly shares in the NSC 
sample and the FSA data by fiscal year.46 As seen in the panels, private not-for-profit and for-profit 
institutions are underrepresented throughout the NSC sample relative to the nationally representative FSA 
data, though their coverage increases significantly in later years of the NSC sample. The coverage issues are 
particularly severe prior to fiscal year 1998, leading us to eliminate from the sample individuals who entered 
repayment for the last time before fiscal year 1998.  
 
Related to the aforementioned NSC reporting issues, Table A4 compares completion rates by degree 
attained between the NSC subsample and the ACS 2007. As demonstrated, the NSC records on educational 
attainment in our data are incomplete for a number of individuals. In particular, in the NSC sample, 55.1% 
of individuals with at least some college attendance did not attain any degree, relative to only 36% in the 
ACS sample. This discrepancy suggests that the dropout rate is artificially inflated in our data set and—to 
the extent that leaving school without a degree is positively associated with delinquency (shown in the 
Conclusions section)—is likely to introduce a downward bias in the effect of degree on student loan 
delinquency.  
 
Furthermore, there are systematic differences in the reporting of the highest degree attained between the 
NSC and the ACS. Namely, in the NSC subsample, 5.3%, 23.1%, and 6.5% of college-goers attained an 
associate’s degree, a bachelor’s degree, or master’s degree or more, respectively—much lower than the 
comparable rates of 14%, 35.8%, and 14.2% in the ACS data. The lower rates in the NSC subsample are 
partly accounted for by the fact that 9.9% of individuals with NSC educational records in our sample have a 
degree but the type of the degree is unspecified/unknown. We treat such individuals in the regression 
specifications as a separate category. Overall, the observed inaccuracies in the NSC data coverage are likely 
to reduce the statistical power of variables related to college completion and degree attainment in our 
econometric analysis.  
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Table A3. Student Loan Repayment Shares by School Type: NSC versus FSA Comparison 
 
 
Public  Private  
 
   Not-for-profit For-profit  
Fiscal Year 4-year  2-year  4-year 2-year All Obs. 
Panel A: NSC Sample 
 
       
1995 62.5 25.0  12.5 0.0 0.0 8 
1996 45.5 34.5  16.4 3.6 0.0 55 
1997 48.8 28.4  21.6 0.6 0.6 162 
1998 52.7 21.4  23.5 0.3 2.0 294 
1999 54.5 17.9  22.5 0.7 4.4 457 
2000 46.1 24.0  23.4 0.8 5.8 521 
2001 47.8 18.2  27.3 1.0 5.7 671 
2002 48.8 19.9  25.1 0.3 5.9 742 
2003 47.6 20.0  23.5 0.7 8.2 892 
2004 45.2 21.4  22.3 0.3 10.8 1,035 
2005 46.1 19.6  22.1 0.4 11.9 1,088 
2006 41.5 22.2  22.1 0.4 13.7 1,021 
2007 37.3 23.9  21.6 0.5 16.7 1,270 
2008 38.3 23.7  21.6 0.6 15.9 1,252 
2009 43.3 14.5  25.6 0.5 16.0 1,053 
Panel B: Borrowers Entering Repayment on Federal Student Loans in the United States (from FSA)*  
1995 42.0 14.0  27.0 1.8 15.3 1,864,691 
1996 42.7 14.1  27.1 1.7 14.4 1,986,085 
1997 43.3 14.0  26.8 1.5 14.4 2,115,860 
1998 43.5 14.2  26.7 1.4 14.2 2,180,169 
1999 44.0 14.1  26.6 1.3 14.0 2,266,807 
2000 44.1 13.8  26.7 1.3 14.1 2,357,069 
2001 43.2 13.2  26.7 1.2 15.7 2,359,820 
2002 41.7 13.4  26.5 1.0 17.4 2,392,210 
2003 40.3 14.0  25.7 1.0 19.0 2,569,024 
2004 39.2 14.6  24.7 0.9 20.5 2,858,642 
2005 38.8 14.0  25.9 0.8 20.5 3,528,391 
2006 37.1 14.4  26.0 0.8 21.6 3,939,480 
2007 36.8 15.2  22.5 0.8 24.7 3,363,857 
2008 36.9 14.9  21.6 0.6 26.0 3,409,557 
2009 36.3 14.0  21.9 0.7 27.0 3,709,845 
Note*: For federal student loans. Due to a low number of observations, borrowers entering repayment prior to fiscal year 
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Table A4. Comparison of Degree Attainment between the NSC and ACS Data 
 
All ACS NSC 
No College  41.7 46.0 
At Least Some College 58.3 54.0 
Attainment Rates Among Those with at Least Some College 
No Degree 36.0 55.1 
Associate’s 14.0 5.3 
Bachelor’s 35.8 23.1 
Master’s or More 14.2 6.5 





Mezza and Sommer: Trillion-Dollar Question 
46 Journal of Student Financial Aid  National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators  Vol. 46, N3, 2016 
Appendix B 
 
College Major Categories 
 
Major Category Obs. 
(1) Architecture and urban planning; construction trades 35 
(2) English, foreign languages and literatures; visual and performing arts; philosophy, religion, and theology 223 
(3) Biological, biomedical, and nature conservation studies; natural sciences; agriculture 220 
(4) Communications and journalism; communications technologies and technicians 152 
(5) Computer and information systems 72 
(6) Criminal justice 49 
(7) Economics; geography, history, political science, sociology, and social sciences; psychology; area, ethnic, and 
gender studies; parks, recreation, and leisure studies; family and consumer sciences 436 
(8) Education 259 
(9) Engineering; engineering technologies and trades; mechanic and repair technologies; precision production 151 
(10) Business, management, and marketing 547 
(11) Health professions and studies 311 
(12) Legal professions and studies 75 
(13) Public administration and social work 59 
(14) Liberal arts and sciences 74 
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Summary statistics calculated from data based on less than 30 observations are reported as NA. 
 
 
Table C1. Distribution of Student Loan Debt in the NSC Sample, All College-Goers 
 
Student Loan Debt % Cum. % Obs. 
No Debt 43.8 43.8 8,213 
$0 to $10,000 18.2 62.0 3,405 
$10,000 to $20,000 11.7 73.7 2,194 
$20,000 to $30,000 8.3 81.9 1,551 
$30,000 to $50,000 7.3 89.2 1,362 
$50,000 to $75,000 3.4 92.6 642 
More than $75,000 3.6 96.2 667 
Missing Debt 3.8 100.0 714 
Total     18,748 
 
 
Table C2. Distribution of Student Loan Debt in the Final Sample 
 
Student Loan Debt % Cum. % Obs. 
No Debt 36.4 36.4 2,418 
$0 to $10,000 22.1 58.5 1,470 
$10,000 to $20,000 15.2 73.6 1,008 
$20,000 to $30,000 10.6 84.2 706 
$30,000 to $50,000 4.6 88.8 307 
$50,000 to $75,000 4.1 93.0 275 
More than $75,000 7.0 100.0 467 
Total     6,651 
 
 
Table C3. Distribution of Student Loan Debt in the Final Sample, by Delinquency Status 
 
Student Loan Debt 
Not Delinquent  Delinquent 
% Cum. % Obs.  % Cum. % Obs. 
No Debt 34.7 34.7 1,595  51.8 51.8 823 
$0 to $10,000 24.7 59.4 1,135  21.1 72.9 335 
$10,000 to $20,000 17.9 77.3 821  11.8 84.7 187 
$20,000 to $30,000 12.1 89.4 556  9.4 94.1 150 
$30,000 to $50,000 5.4 94.7 246  3.8 98.0 61 
$50,000 to $75,000 5.3 100.0 243  2.0 100.0 32 
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Table C4. Distribution of Student Loan Debt, by Highest Degree Attended 
 




% Cum. % Obs. 
 
% Cum. % Obs. 
No Debt 51.0 51.0 5,307 
 
20.8 20.8 321 
$0 to $10,000 20.6 71.6 2,146 
 
8.8 29.6 135 
$10,000 to $20,000 11.7 83.3 1,220 
 
11.0 40.6 170 
$20,000 to $30,000 7.6 90.8 788 
 
11.0 51.6 169 
$30,000 to $50,000 4.2 95.0 437 
 
15.8 67.5 244 
$50,000 to $75,000 1.0 96.0 104 
 
12.3 79.7 189 
More than $75,000 NA NA NA 
 
16.6 96.3 255 
Missing Debt 3.8 100.0 394 
 
3.7 100.0 57 
Total     10,415 
 
   1,540 
Note: Undergraduate includes less or exactly a bachelor’s degree. Graduate includes at least some education beyond a 
bachelor’s degree. 797 observations are missing because it was not possible to determine the degree. 
 
 
Table C5. Distribution of Student Loan Debt in Final Sample, by Highest Degree Attended and 
Delinquency Status 
 
  Student Debt Level 
Not Delinquent  Delinquent 
  % Cum. % Obs.  % Cum. % Obs. 
Undergraduate 
$0 to $10,000 41.2 41.2 1,353  55.5 55.5 793 
$10,000 to $20,000 27.5 68.7 905  22.1 77.6 315 
$20,000 to $30,000 18.9 87.6 620  11.8 89.4 168 
$30,000 to $50,000 9.7 97.3 320  8.2 97.5 117 
$50,000 to $75,000 2.2 99.5 71  2.3 99.9 33 
More than $75,000 NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
Total   3,286    1,428 
Graduate 
$0 to $10,000 11.8 11.8 124  NA NA NA 
$10,000 to $20,000 15.4 27.2 161  NA NA NA 
$20,000 to $30,000 15.2 42.4 159  NA NA NA 
$30,000 to $50,000 20.4 62.8 214  26.3 52.6 30 
$50,000 to $75,000 15.7 78.5 165  NA NA NA 
More than $75,000 21.5 100.0 225  26.3 100.0 30 
Total   1,048    114 
Note: Undergraduate includes less or exactly a bachelor’s degree. Graduate includes at least some education beyond a bachelor’s 
degree. 262 non-delinquent borrowers and 46 delinquent borrowers are not reported because of missing highest degree attended. 
 
 
Table C6. Debt Levels and Delinquency Rates, by Highest Degree Attended 
 
  Mean Media Delinquency Rate Obs. 
Undergraduate 15.2 11.7 30.3 4,714 
Graduate 53.3 39.1 9.8 1,162 
Total    5,876 
Note: 308 borrowers are not included because the highest degree attended could not be determined. 
Mezza and Sommer: Trillion-Dollar Question 
Journal of Student Financial Aid  National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators  Vol. 46, N3, 2016 49 
Table C7. Distribution of Student Loan Debt, by Highest Degree Obtained 
 
Student Loan Debt  With College, No Bachelor’s  With at Least a Bachelor’s 
% Cum. % Obs.  % Cum. % Obs. 
No Debt 56.6 56.6 4,250  31.3 31.3 1,401 
$0 to $10,000 22.8 79.4 1,716  12.7 44.0 567 
$10,000 to $20,000 9.0 88.4 679  16.0 60.0 716 
$20,000 to $30,000 4.2 92.7 318  14.3 74.3 641 
$30,000 to $50,000 2.6 95.2 194  10.9 85.2 488 
$50,000 to $75,000 0.8 96.0 57  5.3 90.5 237 
More than $75,000 NA NA NA  5.9 96.4 263 
Missing debt 3.9 100.0 290  3.6 100.0 162 
Total   7,515    4,475 
Note: With College, No Bachelor’s includes dropouts, certificates, associate’s degree holders. With at Least a 
Bachelor’s includes bachelor’s and advanced degrees. 762 observations are not reported because highest degree 
obtained could not be determined. 
 
 
Table C8. Distribution of Student Loan Debt in Final Sample, by Highest Degree Obtained and 
Delinquency Status 
 
  Student Loan Debt 
Not Delinquent  Delinquent 
  % Cum. % Obs.  % Cum. % Obs. 
With College,  
No Bachelor’s 
No Debt 54.6 54.6 952  62.0 62.0 764 
$0 to $10,000 23.5 78.2 410  21.8 83.8 269 
$10,000 to $20,000 11.9 90.1 208  8.9 92.7 110 
$20,000 to $30,000 7.5 97.6 130  5.2 97.9 64 
$30,000 to $50,000 1.8 99.4 32  NA NA NA 
$50,000 to $75,000 NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
More than $75,000   1,742    1,233 
With at Least 
Bachelor’s 
$0 to $10,000 20.2 20.2 527 12.9 12.9 40 
$10,000 to $20,000 25.4 45.6 661  17.8 30.7 55 
$20,000 to $30,000 22.0 67.7 573  22.0 52.8 68 
$30,000 to $50,000 15.6 83.2 405  26.9 79.6 83 
$50,000 to $75,000 7.9 91.1 205  10.4 90.0 32 
More than $75,000 8.9 100.0 232  10.0 100.0 31 
Total   2,603    309 
Note: With College, No Bachelor’s includes dropouts, certificates, associate’s degree holders. With at Least a Bachelor’s includes 
bachelor’s and advanced degrees. 762 observations are not reported because highest degree obtained could not be determined. 
 
  
Mezza and Sommer: Trillion-Dollar Question 
50 Journal of Student Financial Aid  National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators  Vol. 46, N3, 2016 
Table C9. Debt Levels and Delinquency Rates in the Final Sample, by Highest Degree Obtained 
 
  Mean Median Delinquency Rate Obs. 
With College, No Bachelor’s 12.5 8.0 41.4 2,975 
With at Least Bachelor’s 33.2 22.0 10.6 2,912 
Total    5,887 
Note: 297 borrowers are not included because highest degree obtained could not be determined. 
 
 
Table C10. Distribution of Student Loan Debt in Final Sample (Most Disaggregated), by Highest 
Degree Obtained and Delinquency Status 
 
  Student Debt Level 
Not Delinquent  Delinquent 
  % Cum. % Obs.  % Cum. % Obs. 
Dropouts 
$0 to $10,000 54.9 54.9 811  63.0 63.0 725 
$10,000 to $20,000 22.5 77.4 333  20.4 83.4 235 
$20,000 to $30,000 12.3 89.7 182  9.3 92.7 107 
$30,000 to $50,000 7.6 97.3 112  5.2 97.9 60 
$50,000 to $75,000 2.1 99.4 31  NA NA NA 
More than $75,000 NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
Total   1,478    1,151 
Associate’s/Certificate 
$0 to $10,000 53.4 53.4 141  47.6 47.6 39 
$10,000 to $20,000 29.2 82.6 77  41.5 89.0 34 
$20,000 to $30,000 NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
$30,000 to $50,000 NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
$50,000 to $75,000 NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
More than $75,000 NA NA NA     
Total   264    82 
Bachelor’s 
$0 to $10,000 24.1 24.1 426  14.5 14.5 33 
$10,000 to $20,000 29.8 53.9 526  20.7 35.2 47 
$20,000 to $30,000 25.3 79.2 447  26.9 62.1 61 
$30,000 to $50,000 13.4 92.6 236  28.6 90.7 65 
$50,000 to $75,000 4.8 97.3 84  NA NA NA 
More than $75,000 2.7 100.0 47  NA NA NA 
Total   1,766    227 
More than Bachelor’s 
$0 to $10,000 15.1 15.1 80  NA NA NA 
$10,000 to $20,000 16.0 31.1 85  NA NA NA 
$20,000 to $30,000 16.8 47.8 89  NA NA NA 
$30,000 to $50,000 19.6 67.4 104  NA NA NA 
$50,000 to $75,000 14.3 81.7 76  NA NA NA 
More than $75,000 18.3 100.0 97  NA NA NA 
Total   531    41 
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Table C11. Debt Levels and Delinquency Rates in the Final Sample (Most Disaggregated), by 
Highest Degree Obtained 
 
 Mean Median Delinquency Rate (%) Obs. 
Dropouts 12.5 7.9 43.8 2,629 
Associate’s/Certificate 12.3 9.2 23.7 346 
Bachelor’s 24.1 19.6 11.4 1,993 
More than Bachelor’s 48.3 34.2 7.2 572 
Total      5,540 




Mezza and Sommer: Trillion-Dollar Question 
52 Journal of Student Financial Aid  National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators  Vol. 46, N3, 2016 
Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Figures are based on authors’ calculations from the NYFed CCP/Equifax data set for 2005:Q2 and 
2015:Q2. Nominal amounts are deflated by CPI-U into constant 2015:Q2 dollars. 
2 See, for example, Pilon, M. (2010, February 13). The $555,000 student-loan burden. Wall Street Journal; 
Glater, J. (2009, July 1). “Finding debt a bigger hurdle than bar exam,” New York Times, July 1, 2009. 
3 For an analysis that looks at alternative measures of repayment and non-repayment (including default, 
deferment and forbearance) of federal student loans, see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2014). The analysis 
concentrates on students receiving a bachelor’s degree in 1993.  
4 Some of these factors likely are likely to be future employment prospects and realized incomes relative to 
debt incurred to fund one’s postsecondary education. 
5 For an example of such initiatives, see the U.S. Department of Education press release “U.S. Departments 
of Education and Treasury Announce Collaboration with Intuit Inc. to Raise Awareness about Income-
Driven Repayment Options for Student Loans” from January 24, 2014 at http://www.ed.gov. 
6 Two such recently introduced plans are the Income-Based Repayment (IBR) plan—available since 2009—
and the (ii) Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) repayment plan—available since 2012. While the two plans vary in 
some of the eligibility requirements, they both offer low income-based payments tied to discretionary 
income over long amortization periods (from 20 to 25 years, depending on the specific plan). Additionally, 
the Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR) plan has been available for Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP) 
loan borrowers since the inception of the FDLP in 1994. 
7 Income-driven repayment plans are intended to make student loan debt more manageable by reducing 
monthly payment amounts. While we were not able to measure debt manageability in our data per se, there 
is likely a link between borrowers’ ability to manage their student loan debt and delinquency risk. For an 
analysis of student debt manageability, see Thompson and Bricker (2014). 
8 As of the second quarter of 2015, about 19% of borrowers and 33.5% of outstanding Federal Direct 
Student Loan balances were enrolled in income-driven repayment plans 
(https://studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/student/portfolio). These figures include those enrolled in 
ICR, IBR, and PAYE plans. Interestingly, the enrollment figures indicate that those currently enrolled have 
higher balances, on average, than the average FDLP loan borrower (about $50,000 versus $28,000), 
suggesting that a significant number of borrowers taking advantage of these plans are borrowers with high 
balances. As we will show, these are not the borrowers that are most frequently associated with 
delinquencies and defaults. 
9 Student loan borrowers do not have to start repaying their student loans right away after school exit, in 
general. The “waiting” period after school exit and before repayment begins, known as the grace period, 
typically lasts six months. 
10 All the merges of individual-level information have been performed by TransUnion LLC, in conjunction 
with the National Student Clearinghouse, and the U.S. Department of Education. The merges have been 
done based on a combination of Social Security number, date of birth, and individuals’ first and last names. 
None of the variables used to merge individuals across sources is available in our data set. 
11 The IPEDS includes school-level information such as tuition, sector (e.g., public, private for-profit and 
not-for-profit, open admission), and SAT and ACT scores. 
12 The school-level CDR is computed as the percentage of borrowers at a given school who enter repayment 
on federal loans during a particular federal fiscal year and default on their student loan(s) prior to the end of 
the next fiscal year. 
13 This college-going rate broadly matches the comparable rate of 58% in the nationally representative 
American Community Survey (ACS) 2007 public files. 
14 Even though not perfectly comparable, about 60% of individuals who earned bachelor’s degrees in 2011-
12 from a non-profit institution at which they began their studies graduated with debt (College Board, 
2013). This fraction has fluctuated only in a narrow range since 1999. 
Mezza and Sommer: Trillion-Dollar Question 
Journal of Student Financial Aid  National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators  Vol. 46, N3, 2016 53 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
15 In the credit bureau data, we cannot identify borrowers who entered deferment or forbearance after a 
school exit. This potentially reduces the observed delinquency rate in our sample, and potentially biases our 
results if borrowers’ decisions to exercise these options are correlated with their characteristics. 
16 The credit score used in this analysis is the TU TransRisk AM Score and it ranges from 270 to 900 points. 
17 Additional criteria for a FICO score apply. The borrower also has to have at least one undisputed account 
that has been reported to the credit bureau within the past six months, and there must be no indication that 
individual(s) associated with the credit record is/are deceased. For more information, see 
http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/questions/requirement-for-fico-score.aspx. Scores developed by 
other companies, such as the score used in this analysis, may differ slightly in the criteria used to score 
individuals. 
18 Severe derogatory events associated with student loan debt, such as federal student debt defaults, are 
included in our definition of 120+ days past due delinquency measure. Due to federal law, negative 
information has historically been removed from the credit file after seven years. 
19 Some borrowers have interrupted educational periods, meaning that they enter repayment but later re-
enroll and continue their education. Our dependent variable is thus defined with respect to the last time 
when a borrower enters repayment in our sample. 
20 The fact that CDR varies by school motivated our decision to cluster at the school level. The significance 
of our regression estimates is essentially unchanged when standard errors are not clustered. 
21 We include an indicator variable that takes a value of one (zero otherwise) for 467 individuals who hold 
student loan debt when entering repayment, but the balance amount is missing in the data. 
22 We are not the first to point this out; see, for example, Dynarski, S. (2015, June 11). “Student loans and 
defaults: The facts.” New York Times. For a profile overview of high-debt borrowers, see Kantrowitz, M. 
(2012, Aug. 1). “Who graduates college with six-figure student loan debt?” 
http://www.finaid.org/educators/20120801sixfiguredebt.pdf 
23 We group degrees into the following categories: dropouts (i.e., those with at least some college but no 
attained degree), associate’s or certificate degree holders, bachelor’s degree holders, holders of a master’s 
degree or more, and those with a completed degree for which the degree type is unknown due to NSC 
reporting issues. College majors are available only for those with completed degrees and we aggregate them 
into 15 different categories (see Appendix B). Additionally, 138 borrowers with degrees have no major 
information. Thus, the regression specifications include an indicator variable that takes a value of one (zero 
otherwise) if the individual has a major of an unknown type. 
24 Additionally, we considered an alternative specification where student loan balances were interacted with 
the degree indicators. Given the low predictive power of these interaction terms, we excluded them from 
the final analysis. 
25 Given the non-causal nature of our analysis, this result does not necessarily imply that pushing dropouts 
to finish their degrees will help them to repay their debt. 
26 Examples include delayed postsecondary enrollment, having an independent status and dependents, being 
a single parent, working full time, or attending part time. 
27 Those with degrees in languages, literatures or visual arts; social sciences; education; legal professions; 
public administration; liberal arts and sciences; communications and journalism; criminal justice; and 
personal and culinary services are significantly more likely to become delinquent on their student debt 
relative to engineering majors, all else equal. 
28 For example, if a borrower was last associated with a private four-year, not-for-profit institution, but 
previously also attended a public two-year school and a for-profit school, the total effect of the borrower’s 
sector attendance decisions on student loan delinquency risk can be calculated by adding up the coefficients 
on Private Four-year Not-for-profit, Ever Public Two-year, and Ever Private For-profit indicator variables 
in Table 9. 
29 Additionally, we considered an alternative specification where we interacted student loan balances with the 
indicators for the last school sector attended. Given the low predictive power of these interaction terms, we 
excluded them from the final analysis. 
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30 As was the case with dropouts, the positive relationship between delinquency risk and attending a for-
profit institution is not necessarily causal. However, for the purpose of identifying characteristics predicting 
future credit risk, for-profit institution attendance is a relevant variable to consider. 
31 For sanctions and benefits for schools with high and low CDRs, respectively, see Section 2.4 of 
https://ifap.ed.gov/DefaultManagement/guide/attachments/CDRMasterFile.pdf. 
32 Credit scores for this group are coded as zero. 
33 Given the correlation between lagged credit score and degree completion, some of these factors might be 
related to borrowers’ ability to manage debt due to, for example, lack of financial literacy or income effects. 
34 For assumptions, see Notes in Figure 4. Again, this results should not be interpreted as causal. 
35 To consider the maximum impact that student loan debt could have on predicting future student loan 
delinquency risk, we used unweighted results—reported in Column (7)—for this exercise. For additional 
assumptions, see Notes in Figure 5. 
36 The predictive power of student loans is the largest at low levels of student loan debt. For example, in the 
panel to the right of Figure 5, an increase in student loan debt from $1,000 to $10,000 dollars is associated 
with a 15% increase in the baseline probability of future student loan delinquency (from 6.8% to 7.9%). At 
higher student loan levels, the contribution of additional $10,000 dollars of student loan debt is much 
smaller. For example, an increase in student loan debt from $30,000 to $40,000 increases the baseline 
probability by 1.6% (from 8.4% to 8.5%). 
37 Borrowers with loans in deferment or forbearance—other indicators that might point to a troubled 
status—could also be targeted. 
38 As in our final specification, the Pell Grant controls include the binary indicator for Pell Grant recipients 
as well as the average Pell Grants received. 
39 As of 2015:Q1, about 17.5% of borrowers and 31.5% of outstanding FDLP balances were enrolled in 
income-driven repayment plans (https://studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/student/portfolio). These 
figures include those enrolled in ICR, IBR, and PAYE plans. Interestingly, the enrollment figures indicate 
that those currently enrolled have higher balances, on average, than the average FDLP loan borrower (about 
$50,000 versus $28,000), suggesting that a significant number of borrowers taking advantage of these plans 
are borrowers with high balances. As indicated above, these are not the borrowers that are most frequently 
associated with delinquencies and defaults. 
40 All the merges of individual-level information have been performed by TransUnion LLC in conjunction 
with the National Student Clearinghouse, the College Board, and the U.S. Department of Education. The 
merges were based on a combination of Social Security number, date of birth, and individuals’ first and last 
names. None of the variables used to merge individuals across sources is available in our data set. 
41 The ACS estimate is based on a cohort of individuals between ages 25 to 34 in 2007. In our sample, 
individuals were between ages 26 to 34 in 2007. 
42 An additional reason an enrollment record may not be present in our data is due to data truncation related 
to the 2007 NSC data collection cutoff that is specific to our data set. However, this channel has no effect 
on comparability of the college-going rate in the NSC sample with the ACS estimate. 
43 The average Pell Grant balance is calculated as the total amount of Pell Grants received divided by the 
number of disbursements. 
44 The NSLDS contains information on enrollment periods that have been funded by federal student loans. 
45 The FSA data are available for download at: http://www.ifap.ed.gov/DefaultManagement/press/. 
Unfortunately, the FSA data do not account for those borrowers entering repayment who exclusively hold 
private student loan debt. However, according to our data, less than 2% of borrowers hold only private 
student loan debt and no federal student loans by the time they enter their last repayment period observed 
in our sample. 
46 Fiscal year is defined as the period between October 1 of a given year and September 30 of the following 
year. 
